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Regulating Disinformation in Europe: 
Implications for Speech and Privacy 
Joris van Hoboken* & Ronan Ó Fathaigh** 
This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of 
disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been 
a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online 
platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in 
different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and 
the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers 
seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms 
to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures 
raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused 
to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for 
disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. 
However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to 
user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a 
shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At 
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic 
regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning data-
driven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about 
targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as 
social media companies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been a troubling wave of regulation sweeping across Europe 
targeting disinformation on online platforms, with regulation further accelerating 
during the Covid-19 pandemic.1 This regulation has not only taken the form of 
legislation but has also encompassed other forms of government pressure on 
platforms to combat disinformation. Indeed, platforms that once refused to 
cooperate with European governments in identifying users responsible for 
disseminating allegedly illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation.2 
While these developments have profound implications for the right to freedom of 
expression, there are also complicated implications for the rights to privacy and 
protection of personal data. This is because greater transparency and access to 
platform data are considered crucial tools in understanding disinformation and the 
impact of social media on societies more generally.3 However, access to data raises 
acute issues for user privacy, and indeed, platforms are invoking data protection law 
concerns in response to recent efforts at increased transparency. Such concerns 
notwithstanding, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic 
 
1. See Council of Europe, Comm’r for Human Rights, Press Freedom Must Not Be 
Undermined By Measures to Counter Disinformation About COVID-19 (2020), https://www.coe. 
int/en/web/commissioner/-/press-freedom-must-not-be-undermined-by-measures-to-counterdisinf 
ormation-about-covid-19 (criticizing measures taken in a number of European countries targeting 
disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic); see also David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Disease Pandemics and 
the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 23, 2020). 
2. See Mathieu Rosemain, In a World First, Facebook to Give Data on Hate Speech Suspects to French 
Courts, REUTERS (June 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-tech-exclusive/exclusive 
-in-a-world-first-facebook-to-give-data-on-hate-speech-suspects-to-french-courts-idUSKCN1TQ1TJ; 
see also Natasha Lomas, Germany Tightens Online Hate Speech Rules to Make Platforms Send Reports Straight to 
the Feds, TECHCRUNCH (June 19, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-
online-hate-speech-rules-to-make-platforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds. 
3. See Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to Disinformation, at 22 (Mar. 2018) (arguing that “access to platforms’ data is 
key to a better understanding the dissemination patterns of digital disinformation”). 
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regulatory safeguards in Europe against data-driven manipulation, protecting user 
autonomy in relation to data-driven campaigns, requiring transparency toward users 
about targeting, and granting data subject rights in relation to online platforms.4 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the implications of disinformation 
regulation in the European Union on both the right to freedom of expression and 
the right to privacy. In particular, the Article addresses the double-edged role 
operated by European fundamental rights law. On the one hand, government 
regulation of disinformation represents a danger to the exercise of freedom of 
expression.5 On the other hand, under European freedom of expression principles, 
the state has a positive obligation to create an enabling environment for freedom of 
expression, including putting in place appropriate legal frameworks to allow a 
plurality of voices.6 Similarly, disinformation regulation represents a danger to the 
right to privacy and data protection (such as surveillance and monitoring of legal 
content and online expressive and political activity). And yet, European data privacy 
laws also offer a systemic safeguard for the protection of privacy and personal data. 
This Article also discusses the implications of European disinformation 
regulation and the consequent regulatory pressure being focused on the 
responsibilities of dominant online platforms, almost all of which are not 
headquartered in Europe.7 In this regard, while there are justified criticisms of 
European disinformation policy, it must be recognized that this policy is quite 
centrally about the impact these non-EU platforms have on the functioning of 
European democracies and the responsiveness of these platforms to national laws 
and conditions.8 As such, the Article situates European disinformation regulation 
within the broader framework of transnational legal ordering, where European 
disinformation regulation can be viewed as a transnational legal order (TLO), 
comprised of a “collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations 
and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across 
national jurisdictions.”9 As described below, European disinformation regulation 
 
4. For a study on data-subject access rights under EU data protection law, see Jef Ausloos & 
Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors – Data Subject Access Rights In Practice, 8(1) INT’L DATA PRIV. 
L. 4, (KU Leuven Centre For IT & IP Law, CiTiP Working Paper 32/2018, 2018). 
5. Such as content-based restrictions on political expression. 
6. See Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. v. Italy, App. No. 38433/09, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 339, 386–87.  
7. Valentina Pop & Sam Schechner, Tech Giants to Face EU Legal Push on Content, Competition, 
Taxes, WALL St. J. (July 5, 2020), www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-to-face-eu-legal-push-on-content-
competition-taxes-11593967270. 
8. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – On the European Democracy Action Plan, at 2, COM 
(2020) 790 final (Mar. 12, 2020). 
9. See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, Transnational Legal Orders, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3, 5 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015); see also 
GREGORY SHAFFER & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, With, Within, and Beyond the State: The Promise and Limits 
of Transnational Legal Ordering, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen 
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involves norms (a) formalized through hard and soft law, (b) produced by EU 
member states and in conjunction with EU bodies and networks that transcend EU 
nation-states, and (c) bodies (such as police) within multiple EU member states. All 
the while, this TLO seeks to settle norms around disinformation across nation-state 
boundaries in Europe and indeed beyond Europe. 
Part I sets out the various forms that current disinformation regulation takes 
and how such regulation squares with the right to freedom of expression. Part II 
discusses the implications for the right to privacy, particularly related to police and 
government access to data and the sharing of user data. Part III then assesses how 
data protection law may provide a structural safeguard for protecting against the 
excesses of data-driven disinformation.  
I. EUROPEAN DISINFORMATION LAW AND POLICY   
The notion of disinformation is but the latest and more palatable offshoot of 
the much-maligned notion of fake news.10 Following the widespread use of the term 
by then-candidate Donald J. Trump in criticizing U.S. media during his 2016 
presidential campaign, the term, unfortunately, migrated to Europe. Rather than 
reject the use of such a term, some policymakers at the EU and national level not 
only adopted the term but even began proposing legislation to restrict fake news. 
For example, in early 2017, a bill was introduced in the Italian parliament proposing 
to criminalize spreading “false, exaggerated, or biased” news reports online.11 Then, 
in the summer of 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on 
the European Commission to analyze the legal framework on fake news and 
consider the possibility of “legislative intervention” to limit the dissemination and 
spreading of fake content.12  
Fortunately, rather than rush to implement fake news legislation, an 
independent high-level expert group (HLEG) was established by the European 
 
ed. 2021); Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231 
(2016). 
10. See Tarlach McGonagle, “Fake News”: False Fears or Real Concerns?, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 
203, 209 (2017) (arguing “accusations of peddling ‘fake news’ can stigmatize and undermine critical 
media and erode public trust and confidence in the Fourth Estate.”); JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, NAOMI 
APPELMAN, RONAN Ó FATHAIGH, PADDY LEERSSEN, TARLACH MCGONAGLE, NICO VAN EIJK, & 
NATALI HELBERGER, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE DISSEMINATION OF DISINFORMATION 
THROUGH INTERNET SERVICES AND THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING 24 (2019) 
(discussing how the term is “strongly associated with political and historical strategies to discredit 
journalists”); Fernando Nuñez, Disinformation Legislation and Freedom of Expression, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 783, 786 (2020) (arguing the term is “not helpful because it has been routinely used to describe 
subjectively unfavorable content”). 
11. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression), Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. OL ITA 1/2018, at p. 1 (Mar. 20, 2018). 
12. Resolution on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
P8_TA(2017)0272  (2017).  
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Commission, and it wholly rejected the use of the term “fake news,” as it was 
“inadequate,” “misleading,” and appropriated by politicians to “undermine 
independent news media.”13 This echoed a separate independent report drawn up 
for the Council of Europe, which similarly argued against the use of the term due 
to it being a “mechanism by which the powerful can clamp down upon, restrict, 
undermine and circumvent the free press.”14 The Commission’s expert-group 
report focused instead on the dangers of disinformation, which was defined as 
“false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to 
intentionally cause public harm or for profit.”15 The report stated that while 
disinformation was not necessarily illegal, it can be “harmful for citizens and society 
at large.”16 In particular, disinformation can threaten the integrity of European 
media systems and political processes, and represents a special threat to the integrity 
of elections.17 
In the growing literature on disinformation, experts distinguish three 
perspectives on disinformation that require attention: (1) the content perspective, 
(2) the actor perspective, and (3) the manner of distribution perspective.18 First, 
disinformation can be seen from the perspective of the actual content of 
communications and publication. Something could be qualified as disinformation 
because the content is false or misleading in particular ways. The content 
perspective has been relatively dominant in regulatory discussions and public 
debate. Second, disinformation can be seen with respect to the actors that are 
behind particular communicative actions. Something could be qualified as 
disinformation due to the particular involvement of (and potential deliberate 
confusion about) specific manipulative actors, such as foreign state actors. Third, 
something can be qualified as disinformation due to the way in which the 
information is distributed, “encompass[ing] the variety of techniques viral deception 
actors may use to enhance and exaggerate the reach, virality and impact of their 
campaigns.”19 Notably, European scholars have begun attempting to measure the 
 
13. Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, supra note 
3, at 10.  
14. CLAIRE WARDLE & HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INFORMATION 
DISORDER: TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY MAKING 
16 (2017). 
15. Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, supra note 
3, at 13. 
16. Id. at 35.  
17. Id. at 12.  
18. See Camille François, Actors, Behaviors, Content: A Disinformation ABC Highlighting 
Three Vectors of Viral Deception to Guide Industry & Regulatory Responses 2 (Sept. 20, 2019) 
(Transatlantic High-Level Working Grp. on Content Moderation Online & Freedom of Expression, 
Working Paper).  
19. Id. at 4.  
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actual effects on political attitudes of certain forms and techniques of disseminating 
manipulated content, such as manipulated political videos known as “deepfakes.”20   
Notably, the report of the high-level expert group created by the Commission 
focused on the role of online platforms and how they facilitate the production and 
circulation of disinformation in new ways and on vast scales. The report singled out 
the data-driven services and mechanisms offered by platforms that are said to be 
harnessed by those engaging in disinformation, namely: “behavioral data collection, 
analytics, advertising exchanges, tools for cluster detection and tracking social media 
sentiment, and various forms of AI/machine learning.”21 Crucially, the report 
recommended against “[a]ny form of censorship either public or private,”22 but 
delivered a range of recommendations to tackle disinformation based on five pillars: 
(1) enhance the transparency of the digital information ecosystem, (2) promote the 
use of media and information literacy to counter disinformation, (3) develop tools 
for empowering users and journalists and foster a positive engagement with fast-
evolving information technologies, (4) safeguard the diversity and sustainability of 
the European news media ecosystem, and (5) conduct continuous research on the 
impact of disinformation in Europe.23 
Following the report, the European Commission adopted an influential 
Communication in 2018, entitled Tackling online disinformation: a European approach, 
which omitted the use of the term fake news and instead focused on 
disinformation.24 The Commission defined disinformation as “verifiably false or 
misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic 
gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm.”25 The 
Commission did not provide a reference for this definition, but as we and others 
have noted, it bears a striking resemblance to a number of so-called false news laws 
that have been found by national supreme courts to violate freedom of expression 
standards.26 Significantly, the Commission decided against any form of legislative 
proposal on disinformation, and instead it took the following approach.  
In October 2018, the Commission unveiled the EU Code of Practice on 
Disinformation, which had been agreed to by several online platforms (Facebook, 
Google, Twitter, Mozilla, and more recently, Microsoft and TikTok) and advertising 
 
20. See Tom Dobber, Nadia Metoui, Damian Trilling, Natali Helberger & Claes de Vreese, Do 
(Microtargeted) Deepfakes Have Real Effects on Political Attitudes?, INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 1 (2020), https://doi. 
org/10.1177/1940161220944364. 
21. Commission’s High Level Expert Group’s Report on Fake News and Online Disinformation, at 22 
(Mar. 12, 2018), http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50271.  
22. Id. at 5.  
23. Id. at 5–6.  
24. Commission Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, COM(2018) 
236 final (Mar. 12, 2018).  
25. Id. at 3–4. 
26. VAN HOBOKEN ET. AL, supra note 10, at 41 (giving examples from the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Supreme Court, of Zimbabwe and Supreme Court of Uganda). 
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industry associations.27 The Code was designed to commit online platforms and the 
advertising industry to a number of objectives set out in five pillars: (1) improve the 
scrutiny of advertisement placements, in order to reduce revenues of the purveyors 
of disinformation; (2) increase the transparency of political advertising and issue-
based advertising; (3) ensure the integrity of services with regard to accounts whose 
purpose and intent is to spread disinformation; (4) empower consumers by diluting 
the visibility of disinformation, improving findability of trustworthy content, and 
provide users with easily-accessible tools to report disinformation; and (5) empower 
the research community by providing access to (a) privacy-compliant data for fact-
checking and research activities, (b) relevant data on the functioning of their 
services, and (c) general information on algorithms.28 
In the process leading to the presentation of the Code, a Sounding Board—
established by the European Commission to assess the Code—gave a damning 
opinion. The Sounding Board stated in no uncertain terms that the “so-called” code 
of practice was not a code of practice and “by no means self-regulation,” as it had 
“no clear and meaningful commitments, no measurable objectives or [key 
performance indicators],” and thus, “no possibility to monitor process, and no 
compliance or enforcement tool.”29  
In December 2020, the newly appointed European Commission published its 
proposed reforms of the EU legislative framework applying to online platforms, 
known as the Digital Services Act (DSA).30 The proposed DSA imposes a range of 
new obligations on certain large platforms, including transparency obligations 
relating to content moderation systems,31 recommender systems,32 online 
advertising,33 and independent audits.34 Crucially, certain large platforms will be 
required to manage “systemic risks” stemming from the functioning and use of their 
service in the EU, such as the dissemination of illegal content and “intentional 
manipulation of their service.”35 These systematic risks may also take the form of 
“coordinated operations aimed at amplifying information, including disinformation, 
such as the use of bots or fake accounts for the creation of fake or misleading 
 
27. Preamble, EU CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISINFORMATION (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation [hereinafter EU CODE OF PRACTICE]. 
28. Id. § IIA–IIB. 
29. Sounding Bd. of the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on the Code of Practice, The Sounding Board’s 
Unanimous Final Opinion on the So-Called Code of Practice (Sept. 24, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/ 
dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54456. 
30. See Regulation of the European Parliament an of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services 
(Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020). 
31. Id. at 50. 
32. Id. at 61. 
33. Id. at 31. 
34. Id. at 61.  
35. Id. at 59–60. 
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information.”36 Further, in order to “facilitate supervision and research” in relation 
to disinformation,37 certain large platforms will be required to make publicly 
available repositories of online advertising displayed on their platforms.38  
A. Transparency and Access to Platform Data 
A major European policy objective for tackling disinformation, and indeed 
other problems associated with platforms, is greater transparency of platform 
ecosystems and access to platform data.39 These have been advocated by expert 
groups, academia, civil society, journalists, and regulators. For example, the High-
Level Expert Group on disinformation emphasized that access to platform data was 
“key to a [sic] better understanding the dissemination patterns of digital 
disinformation,”40 to understanding scale and scope of disinformation problems, 
and, crucially, to allowing proper evaluation of the efficiency of responses.41 In 
particular, the Expert Group recommended that platforms should “enable privacy-
compliant access to data for the identification of online disinformation actors, for 
the assessment of fact-checking and debunking strategies and for the study of 
disinformation dynamics by academics.”42 A prominent role for academic research 
was also highlighted. The Expert Group recommended that platforms provide data 
on the “functioning of their services including data for independent investigation 
by academic researchers and general information on algorithms in order to find a 
common approach to address the dissemination and amplification of 
disinformation.”43 
 As mentioned above, the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation has a 
specific pillar dedicated to access to platform data, with platforms committing to 
“support good faith independent efforts to track disinformation and understand its 
impact.” This commitment includes “sharing privacy protected datasets” and not 
prohibiting or discouraging good faith research into disinformation and political 
advertising on their platforms.”44 The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual 
Media Service (ERGA), which comprises the heads of national audiovisual 
regulators from each EU member state, was tasked with monitoring the 
 
36. Id. at 84. 
37. Id. at 82–83. 
38. Id. at 62. 
39. For a discussion of current sources of information on platforms’ content moderation, see 
Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and 
Content Moderation, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS 
FOR REFORM 220-51 (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020). 
40. Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, supra note 
3, at 22. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 25.  
43. Id. at 33.  
44. EU CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 27, § II.E. 
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implementation of the Code of Practice.45 ERGA published a report in June 2020 
on the implementation of the Code’s data access commitments, which contains 
considerable criticism of platforms’ progress with providing access to data.46  
 The ERGA report stated that there were “enormous difficulties” for 
researchers to get access to data. Platforms do not share “crucial data points, 
including data on ad targeting and user engagement with disinformation,” and the 
most important questions about the extent and impact of disinformation “remain 
unanswered.”47 The report does mention that in 2018, Facebook launched Social 
Science One as an “ad hoc program aimed at partnering with academics and sharing 
privacy protected datasets.”48 However, in late 2019, the Co-Chairs and European 
Advisory Committee of Social Science One published a statement expressing 
frustration, as “Facebook has still not provided academics with anything 
approaching adequate data access.”49 The statement strongly articulated that the 
“current situation is untenable,” as “[h]eated public and political discussions are 
waged over the role and responsibilities of platforms in today’s societies, and yet 
researchers cannot make fully informed contributions to these discussions” and 
“are mostly left in the dark, lacking appropriate data to assess potential risks and 
benefits.”50 
ERGA has recommended that platforms be required to share data for research 
purposes,51 and indeed, the EU’s proposed DSA contains substantive new rules on 
access to data.52 An important part of the proposal is the creation of new, dedicated 
national regulatory bodies (Digital Services Coordinators), which would be 
empowered to employ large online platforms to access data that are necessary to 
monitor and assess compliance with the proposed legislation.53  
 
45. Commission and High Representative Joint Communication on the Action Plan Against Disinformation, 
JOIN (2018) 36 final, 9 (May 12, 2018) (“The Commission will, with the help of the European 
Regulators Group for Audio-visual Media Services (ERGA) monitor the implementation of the 
commitments by the signatories of the Code of Practice.”). 
46. See Eur. Reguls. Grp. for Audiovisual Media Servs. (ERGA), ERGA Rep. on Disinformation: 
Assessment of the Implementation of the Code of Practice (2020), https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads 
/2020/05/ERGA-2019-report-published-2020-LQ.pdf. 
47. Id. at 38.  
48. Id. at 35. See SOCIAL SCIENCE ONE, https://socialscience.one (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
49. Public Statement From the Co-Chairs and European Advisory Committee of Social Science One, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE ONE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://socialscience.one/blog/public-statement-european-advisory-
committee-social-science-one.  
50. Id.  
51. Eur. Reguls. Grp. for Audiovisual Media Servs. (ERGA), supra note 46, at 40. 
52. See Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services 
(Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 30, at 62–63. 
53. Id.  
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B. Content-Based Restrictions on Disinformation 
Up to this point in the discussion, the whole premise of EU policy on 
disinformation has been that disinformation is not per se illegal, but it is harmful, 
and the Commission has always distinguished between illegal content (such as child 
abuse material) and harmful content (such as disinformation).54 However, there is 
a growing realization that disinformation may already be or may become prohibited 
and criminalized in a number of EU member states, with more seeking to do so 
during the Covid-19 pandemic.55 Thus, there is an acute danger of European and 
national policy-makers focusing on a notion where there already exist very broad 
and vague laws open to particular abuse.  
One of the most notable national laws containing content-based restrictions 
on disinformation was France’s 2018 law on the fight against the manipulation of 
information.56 The law provides that during the three months prior to an election, 
a court can order an online platform to remove “inaccurate or misleading allegations 
or imputations of fact,” which may “alter the sincerity of an upcoming vote” and 
are “disseminated deliberately, artificially or automatedly,” and on a massive scale.57 
The court is required to deliver a decision within forty-eight hours, and any appeal 
decision must be delivered within forty-eight hours.58 However, what is rarely 
discussed is that France has criminalized publication of “false news” under its 
Freedom of the Press Law 1881 for many years,59 while Article 97 of the Electoral 
Code makes it a criminal offence to spread “false news” with the effect of distorting 
the outcome of an election.60 Indeed, François Fillon, the former Prime Minister of 
France who was recently convicted of embezzling public funds,61 used this false 
news provision to file a criminal complaint against the newspaper that originally 
published the allegations against him during the 2017 presidential elections.62 
 
54. See Commission Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, supra note 
24. 
55. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Tacking COVID-19 Disinformation – Getting 
the Facts Right, JOIN (2020) 8 final (June 10, 2020). 
56. Loi 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de 
l'information [Law 2018-1202 of December 22, 2018 on the fight against the manipulation of 
information], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE]. 
57. Id.  
58. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the 
press], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
art. 27. 
59. Id.  
60. Code électoral [Electoral Code] art. L97. 
61. Aurelien Breeden, François Fillon, Ex-Presidential Hopeful in France, Is Convicted of Embezzlement, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2020, at A10.  
62. Saim Saeed, François Fillon Claims Le Canard Enchainé Illegally Influenced French Election, 
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France is not alone in its content-based restrictions, and similar provisions 
exist in a number of other EU member states. First, Malta’s Criminal Code 
criminalizes spreading false news, which is defined as “maliciously spreading false 
news which is likely to alarm public opinion or disturb public good order or the 
public peace or to create a commotion among the public or among certain classes 
of the public.”63 Second, Lithuania’s Law on the Provision of Information to the 
Public prohibits the dissemination of disinformation, which is defined as 
“intentionally disseminated false information.”64 Third, section 264 of Austria’s 
Criminal Code also criminalizes the dissemination of false news during an election 
or referendum.65 Fourth, under Article 191 of Greece’s Criminal Code, “causing 
fear” by disseminating false news via the Internet is a criminal offence.66 Fifth, 
under Poland’s Local Elections Act, a court may issue an order restraining the 
publication of “untrue data or information” about an election candidate.67  
There have also been a number of content-based restrictions enacted more 
recently during the Covid-19 pandemic targeting the notion of disinformation. For 
example, Romania’s 2020 Presidential Decree permitted the communications 
regulator to order the removal of and block access to online content that “promotes 
false news” regarding Covid-19 protection and prevention measures.68 Similarly, 
Hungary enacted Act XII of 2020 on containment of coronavirus, which amended 
the Criminal Code’s definition of “scaremongering” to include the dissemination of 
“any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact with regard to the public danger 
that is capable of causing disturbance or unrest in a larger group of persons at the 
 
63. CRIMINAL CODE, ART. 82 (amended by the Media and Defamation Act, 2018). 
64. Law on the Provision of Information to the Public, No I-1418, art. 2(13) (1996), amended by 
No XII-2239 of Dec. 23 2015.  
65. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 264 [Verbreitung falscher Nachrichten bei einer 
Wahl oder Volksabstimmung] [Dissemination of false news in an election or referendum] (Austria); see 
Dr. Walter Berka & Dr. Josef Trappel, Internet Freedom in Austria: A Survey Based on the 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to the 
Member States Regarding Internet Freedom 31 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://rm.coe.int/report-of-austria-to-the-council-of-europe-following-recommendation-cm/16808 
c6194 (“[D]istribution of false rumours and manipulated news on the Internet violates existing 
legislation only in exceptional cases, such as when false news is distributed during an election period or 
referendum (sec. 264 StGB).”).   
66. POINIKOS KODIKAS [P.K] [CRIMINAL CODE] 4619:191 (Greece). 
67. Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw [Law of 16 July 
1998 on Elections to Municipalities, District Councils and Regional Assemblies] (Dz.U. 1998 Nr 95 
poz. 602) § 72.  
68. Decret semnat de Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, privind instituirea stării 
de urgență pe teritoriul României, 16 martie 2020 [Decree Signed by the President of Romania, Mr. 
Klaus Iohannis, Regarding the Establishment of the State of Emergency on the Romanian Territory, 
Mar. 16, 2020] art. 54, https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/decret-semnat-de-presedintele-romaniei-
domnul-klaus-iohannis-privind-instituirea-starii-de-urgenta-pe-teritoriul-romaniei; see COVID-19: 
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site of public danger” or “any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact that is 
capable of hindering or preventing the efficiency of protection.”69 Further, Bulgaria 
also adopted draft legislation criminalizing the spread of “internet misinformation” 
and granted the media regulator the power to suspend websites for distributing 
misinformation.70 These are all national legislative measures adopted by EU 
member states that are content-based restrictions applying to the notion of online 
disinformation.  
C. Law Enforcement Involvement 
While European policy does not treat disinformation as illegal content, a 
particular feature of European practice on disinformation is the involvement of law 
enforcement. A concerning example from a freedom of expression perspective can 
be found in Italy where, in the run-up to the 2018 elections, the Ministry of the 
Interior implemented an online reporting service known as the Red Button 
Protocol. Under this Protocol users could “indicate the existence of a network of 
content attributable to fake news.”71 Notably, the Polizia Postale, a police unit that 
investigates online crime, was responsible for reviewing reports. After reviewing the 
information, the police could pursue legal action if it determined that the content is 
unlawful.72 The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression was particularly 
critical of this mechanism, expressing concern that under international standards of 
freedom of expression the restrictions established by the Protocol were 
“inconsistent with the criteria of legality, necessity and proportionality.”73 In 
particular, the Protocol could have a particularly strong “chilling effect” on the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression as the Protocol could function as a 
“pipeline” for criminal prosecutions.74    
 Similarly, in the run-up to the 2018 elections in Spain, the Ministry of the 
Interior announced that teams of police officers would trawl the internet for signs 
of fake news and “keep a particularly close eye” on social media platforms as part 
 
69. 2020. évi XII (Act XII of 2020 on the containment of coronavirus), at § 10(2), amending 
the Criminal Code, § 337 (“Scaremongering”) (Hung.); see Gábor Polyák, “Enabling Act” in Hungary: 
Uncontrolled Government Power, Threatened Press, INTERNET POL’Y REV. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://policyrevie 
w.info/articles/news/enabling-act-hungary-uncontrolled-government-power-threatened-press/1466. 
70. See Press Release, Org. for Sec. & Coop. in Europe (OSCE), COVID-19 Response in 
Bulgaria Should Not Curb Media Freedom, Says OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (Apr. 
15, 2020), https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/450193.  
71. Kaye, supra note 11, at 1; see also Angela Giuffrida, Italians Asked to Report Fake News to 
Police in Run-up to Election, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan 
/19/italians-asked-report-fake-news-police-run-up-election.  
72. Kaye, supra note 11, at 2. 
73. Id. at 4. 
74. Id.  
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of the election security plan.75 During the Covid-19 pandemic, free speech 
organizations such as Article 19 have criticized Spanish police involvement in 
targeting individuals suspected of spreading disinformation.76 In February 2020, 
Spanish prosecutors initiated the first lawsuit for spreading fake news and publicly 
identified the woman involved.77 Similarly, in Hungary, the police have arrested 
individuals on suspicion of spreading fake news.78 In the Netherlands, law 
enforcement agencies have posted videos on Facebook warning about the dangers 
of fake news.79  
 Further, elected officials seek to publicize the involvement of law 
enforcement where disinformation is concerned. For example, in November 2018, 
a Member of the European Parliament publicized a complaint submitted to 
Portuguese police, Belgian police, and Europol regarding a “fake news” website. 
The Member requested that Europol investigate the website, identify who was 
behind it, and “demand the removal of all defamatory content.”80 In Spain, 
members of parliament have also filed a number of criminal complaints against 
individuals for sharing hoaxes about the government’s response to the pandemic. 
These complaints cite laws criminalizing “calumny” and “insult” to state institutions 
under the Spanish Penal Code.81 It is unclear whether fake news and disinformation 
are criminal offences and, moreover, whether the involvement of law enforcement 
is an appropriate remedy.  
D. Pseudo-Militarization of Disinformation Policy  
A further concerning pillar of European disinformation policy that has 
emerged is the involvement of the foreign policy arms of the EU and its member 
 
75. Spanish Police to Watch Web for Fake News Before Vote, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-politics-news/spanish-police-to-watch-web-for-fake-news-
before-vote-idUSL8N2123OP. 
76. Spain: Concerns as Penal Code Used to Criminalise Jokes and Misinformation About Coronavirus, 
ARTICLE 19 (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.article19.org/resources/spain-penal-code-used-to-criminali 
se-jokes-and-misinformation-about-coronavirus/.  
77. Id.; see also AFP, Spanish Prosecutors File Pioneering Lawsuit Against 'Fake News', LOCAL: SPAIN 
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.thelocal.es/20200228/spanish-prosecutors-file-first-lawsuit-against-
fake-news.  
78. See Justin Spike, He Criticized the Government on Facebook, and Was Taken From His Home by 
Police at Dawn, INSIGHTHUNGARY (May 12, 2020), https://insighthungary.444.hu/2020/05/12/he-
criticized -the-government-on-facebook-and-was-taken-from-his-home-by-police-at-dawn.  
79. See Politie Amsterdam, Voorkom verspreiding van nepnieuws: denk voor je deelt [Prevent the Spread of 
Fake News: Think Before Sharing], FACEBOOK (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2 
14686616405935. 
80. Letter from Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament, to Catherine De Bolle, 
Executive Director of Europol (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/25b1d52c-
715a-42da-b3fa-920d499ad5a6.pdf; see also Rosianne Cutajar Reacts to Criminal Complaint by Gomes Over 
Online Article, TIMES MALTA (Nov. 28, 2018). 
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states stimulated by the pseudo-militarization of disinformation policy. Most 
striking is the language being used in relation to disinformation, which is generally 
framed around conflict, combat, weapons, and defense. Josep Borrell, the EU’s 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has 
spoken of how disinformation “can kill,” and in today’s society, “warriors wield 
keyboards rather than swords” with disinformation campaigns being a recognized 
“weapon” that the EU must “fight.”82 This foreign policy aspect of disinformation 
is built upon a number of efforts based on data and information sharing and the 
monitoring of the online environment.83 
 First, the EU established the EU Rapid Alert System (RAS) on 
disinformation. The RAS is a “secure digital platform” and “dedicated technological 
infrastructure,” where EU member states and EU institutions can issue alerts on 
disinformation and facilitate “sharing of data and assessments.”84 Each EU member 
state is required to designate a contact point, and platforms must “cooperate with 
the contact points underpinning the Rapid Alert System, in particular during 
election periods.”85 There is little transparency about the operation of the RAS. 
Governments have neither disclosed what content, data, and information are being 
shared nor how the platforms have responded. But a report published after the 2019 
European Parliament elections stated that there had been “daily exchanges and 
sharing of information,” and, indeed, the RAS had “strengthened cooperation with 
platforms, although the platforms still need to become more responsive to external 
reports.”86 Notably, the RAS has facilitated cooperation with NATO and will be 
“further strengthened in the future.”87 Indeed, EU officials have stated how during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, “we need to continue to work with the platforms, to ask 
to remove a lot of messages,” but “we need to think about a regulation because we 
don’t have for the moment the capacity to go further than that.”88 
Second, disinformation is now considered by the EU to be what is called a 
hybrid threat, alongside radicalization and violent extremism.89 For this reason, the 
EU Hybrid Fusion Cell was established within the EU Intelligence and Situation 
Centre of the EU’s European External Action Service to monitor and address 
 
82. European Commission Press Release IP/20/1006, Coronavirus: EU Strengthens Action to 
Tackle Disinformation (June 10, 2020). 
83. Action Plan Against Disinformation, supra note 35, at 5–8.  
84. Id. at 7.  
85. Id.  
86. Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation, at 3, JOIN(2019)12 final 
(June 14, 2019).  
87. Id. at 3–4. 
88. See Samuel Stolton, Regulation Against Fake News ‘Very Important,’ Reynders Says, EURACTIV 
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/regulation-against-fake-news-very-
important-reynders-says. 
89. Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats, at 3, JOIN(2018)16 final 
(June 13, 2018).  
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hybrid threats by foreign actors, including disinformation.90 Notably, in 2018, 
expert staff were added to engage in “data mining and analysis to process the 
relevant data;” to provide “additional media monitoring services to cover a wider 
range of sources and languages;” and to invest in “analytical tools,” such as 
“dedicated software to mine, organise and aggregate vast amounts of digital data.”91 
 Third, the European Council established the East Stratcom Task Force, also 
within the European External Action Service, to engage in “tracking and tackling 
disinformation.”92 According to the EU, this monitoring has resulted in over 6,500 
individual disinformation cases, many of which deliberately target Europe.”93 This 
has been done through a service called EUvsDisinfo run by the East Stratcom Task 
Force. By using “data analysis and media monitoring services,” EUvsDisinfo 
“identifies, compiles, and exposes disinformation cases.”94 However, EUvsDisinfo 
has faced criticism. Three Dutch news outlets initiated legal proceedings for their 
inclusion on the disinformation repository after various news articles they had 
published were publicly classified as disinformation.95 A few days before the court 
hearing, the articles were removed from the repository and a correction was 
included. 
E. Implications for Freedom of Expression  
The current path being taken by European governments to regulate 
disinformation has profound implications on freedom of expression. First, under 
international human rights standards, the four special international mandates on 
freedom of expression have been quite forthright that “[g]eneral prohibitions on 
the dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including 
‘false news’ or ‘non-objective information,’ are incompatible with international 
 
90. Commission Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, supra note 
24, at 16. 
91. Commission and High Representative Joint Communication on the Action Plan against Disinformation, 
supra note 45, at 5. 
92. Id. at 2.   
93. Id.  
94. See EUvsDisinfo: Disinformation Operations About COVID-19, EU OPEN DATA PORTAL (Apr. 
6, 2020), https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/euvsdisinfo-disinformation-operations-abou 
t-covid-19.  
95. See Michael Peel, Mehreen Khan, & Max Seddon, EU Attack on Pro-Kremlin ‘Fake News’ 
Takes a Hit, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5ec2a204-3406-11e8-ae84-
494103e73f 7f; Cent. Eur. News, Three Dutch Media Outlets to Take the EU to Court in 'Misinformation' Spat, 
PRESS GAZETTE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/three-dutch-media-outlets-to-take-
the-eu-court-in-misinformation-spat/; Emiel Jurjens & Jens van den Brink, Recent Experience Shows EU 
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standards for restrictions on freedom of expression,” and “should be abolished.”96 
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has stated that 
disinformation is an “extraordinarily elusive concept to define in law” and is 
“susceptible to providing executive authorities with excessive discretion to 
determine what is disinformation, what is a mistake, what is truth.”97 As such, the 
“penalization of disinformation is disproportionate” and results in “deterring 
individuals from sharing what could be valuable information.”98 Unfortunately, 
some EU member states, as described above, are enacting and have existing laws 
on disinformation, false information, and false news, which are difficult to reconcile 
with international freedom of expression standards.  
With respect to the proper legal standard for regulation of disinformation in 
Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a number of 
judgments on false information legislation that are instructive. The Court has 
delivered three unanimous judgments concerning a provision under Polish election 
legislation, which allows election candidates to apply to a regional court for an order 
restraining publication of campaign material or statements containing “untrue data 
or information,” with the court required to examine the application “within 24 
hours.”99 Notably, the ECtHR has found in all three judgments, including in a 2019 
judgment, that various proceedings under this provision violated Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).100 For instance, in Brzeziński v. 
Poland, the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 10 because domestic 
courts had “immediately classified as lies” statements made by a local politician 
during an election, and “[b]y following such an approach the domestic courts 
effectively deprived [the politician] of the protection afforded by Article 10.”101 
Further, in Kwiecień v. Poland, the Court found serious deficiencies under proceedings 
for “untrue information” during an election and even held that the “fairness of the 
proceedings may be called into question.”102 Similarly, in Kita v. Poland, the Court 
unanimously found a violation of Article 10 over “untrue information” proceedings, 
holding that the courts “unreservedly qualified all of [the statements] as statements 
which lacked any factual basis,” and the “standards applied” by the courts were “not 
compatible with the principles embodied in Article 10.”103 In general, these cases 
 
96. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and 
Propaganda, FOM.GAL/3/17, (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/30279 
6.pdf. 
97. Kaye, supra note 1, at 13.  
98. Id. 
99. See Brzeziński v. Poland, App. No. 47542/07 at 7 (2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i= 
001-194958. 
100. See id.; Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0 
01-78876; Kita v. Poland, App. No. 57659/00 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87424. 
101. Brzeziński, App. No. 47542/07 at 13. 
102. Kwiecień, App. No. 57659/00 at 18. 
103. Kita, App. No. 57659/00 at 11. 
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demonstrate that there are serious questions about the compatibility of legislation 
that seeks to target false information, but does not allow for examination of whether 
there has actually been undue harm to reputation or candidates’ personality rights.  
The government-platform initiatives also warrant close scrutiny. The human 
rights group Article 19 has expressed its concern over EU disinformation policy as 
it is “plac[ing] increasing pressure on tech companies to monitor and remove 
content on their platforms,” and during the pandemic, platforms “rely more on 
automated content takedowns, with a reduced and remote workforce.”104 We must 
remember that this is all happening outside of a clear legal framework and may 
involve information that is perfectly legal, but considered objectionable by EU and 
national governmental officials. Damian Tambini has argued how vague and 
subjective the notion of disinformation is, which can include content that is legal, 
but “subjectively undesirable.”105 Thus, public officials have great latitude in the 
type of content that may be labelled disinformation and may end up targeting 
expression (however objectionable) that clearly constitutes expression on matters 
of public interest. These types of government-platform initiatives, which operate 
outside a legislative footing, raise acute issues for freedom of expression and 
accountability. Similar systems involving government-platform cooperation are the 
EU’s code of practice on hate speech, the EU Internet Forum, the EU Crisis 
Protocol, and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), which 
has been criticized by a range of NGOs due to the “risks involved in content 
removal coordination among companies.”106 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 
The regulation of disinformation also has distinct implications for the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data. This is because disinformation regulation 
and policy are resulting in increased monitoring and surveillance of the online 
environment and increased access to user data from platforms. As the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has stated, government monitoring of 
information that is publicly available about a person, such as social media posts, 
undoubtedly implicates the right to privacy.107  
 
104. EU Communication on Tackling Coronavirus Disinformation, ARTICLE 19 (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.article19.org/resources/europe-eu-communication-on-tackling-coronavirus-disinformat 
ion/.  
105. See DAMIAN TAMBINI, MEDIA FREEDOM, REGULATION AND TRUST: A SYSTEMIC 
APPROACH TO INFORMATION DISORDER 21 (2020), https://rm.coe.int/cyprus-2020-new-media/ 
16809a524f. 
106. Access Now, et al., Joint Letter to New Executive Director, Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism, Hum. Rts. Watch (July 30, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/30/joint-
letter-new-executive-director-global-internet-forum-counter-terrorism. 
107. U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/39/29, ¶ 6 (Aug. 3, 2018).  
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A. Online Monitoring and Disinformation  
As described above, there is a whole array of EU and national agencies now 
engaged in monitoring the online environment in some form. Police forces in 
various EU member states are engaged in monitoring online discussions in order to 
identify disinformation and make arrests.108 Both Europol and Interpol have 
detailed reports on the activities of national law enforcement in monitoring the 
online environment for disinformation.109 Although transparency is generally 
considered positive, it may be problematic when law enforcement agencies 
constantly remind individuals that they are monitoring and surveilling the online 
environment. In Hungary, police officers arrested individuals who posted online 
comments on the government’s response to Covid-19. The police officers filmed 
and posted search-and-seizure and arrest videos to the national police force’s 
YouTube channel.110 The police also released statements reiterating that its 
cybercrime unit “continuously monitors the content related to the infection on the 
Internet.”111 
A report on online disinformation written for the French Ministry for Europe 
and Foreign Affairs and Ministry for the Armed Forces included a recommendation 
of increased surveillance of “risk communities,” such as “extremist, conspiratorial 
and religious groups,” in order to “better grasp the communities that propagate 
false information on the social networks.”112 Once accounts are identified, 
authorities should engage in “naming and shaming” by naming the source and 
“discredit[ing] the content of the fake news story—either directly, in an official 
manner, or indirectly.”113 
 
108. For the situation outside of the EU, see Mu Sochua, Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Arrests Are 
Quieting Critics, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 22, 2020, 9:23 AM), https://foreigsnpolicy.com/2020/05/22/co 
ronavirus-fake-news-arrests-quiet-critics-southeast-asia/.  
109. See Interpol Report Shows Alarming Rate of Cyberattacks During COVID-19, INTERPOL (Aug. 4, 
2020), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-report-shows-alar 
ming-rate-of-cyberattacks-during-COVID-19; EUROPOL, CATCHING THE VIRUS: CYBERCRIME, 
DISINFORMATION AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020), https://www.europol.europa.eu/publicat 
ions-documents/catching-virus-cybercrime-disinformation-and-covid-19-pandemic.  
110. Alasdair Sandford, Hungary: ‘Critics Silenced’ in Social Media Arrests as EU Debates Orban’s 
Powers, EURONEWS (May 15, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/14/hungary-critics-
silenced-in-social-media-arrests-as-eu-debates-orban-s-powers; Andras Gergely & Veronika Gulyas, 
Orban Uses Crisis Powers for Detentions Under ‘Fake News’ Law, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-13/orban-uses-crisis-powers-for-detentions-
under-fake-news-law; ORFK Communication Service, Not Only Did He “Produce,” He Also Spread The 
Horror News (Mar. 15, 2020, 13:55), http://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-
hireink/bunugyek/nemcsak-gyartotta-terjesztette-is-a-remhirt (video uploaded by the Hungarian 
National Police  Communication Service, showing arrest of suspect for spreading false rumors). 
111. Id. 
112. JEAN-BAPTISTE JEANGÈNE VILMER, ALEXANDRE ESCORCIA, MARINE GUILLAUME & 
JANAINA HERRERA, INFORMATION MANIPULATION: A CHALLENGE FOR OUR DEMOCRACIES 
(2018), https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf. 
113. Id. at 173.  
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Under European human rights law, these surveillance measures may impinge 
on the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. The ECtHR has considered 
whether police violate a person’s right to private life when they gather and retain 
information on a person’s expressive public activity that is not illegal but may be 
concerning to authorities. In the 2019 judgment of Catt v. the United Kingdom,114 an 
anti-war activist discovered he was included on a police extremism database, which 
documented information gathered by police about his presence at perfectly lawful 
protests. Following police refusal to delete the information from the database, the 
European Court ultimately found a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court 
was particularly critical of the police gathering of information based on the term 
“domestic extremism,” which is not prescribed by law and which had a variety of 
working definitions.115 The Court held that the police decision to “retain the 
applicant’s personal data did not take into account the heightened level of 
protection it attracted as data revealing a political opinion, and that in the 
circumstances its retention must have had a ‘chilling effect.’”116 The Court 
reiterated that personal data “revealing political opinions attracts a heightened level 
of protection.” It noted that there is “significant ambiguity over the criteria being 
used by the police to govern the collection of the data in question” and that 
“perhaps as a result, the database in issue appears to have been assembled on a 
somewhat ad hoc basis.”117 
Disinformation is similarly an ambiguous notion, which is in many instances 
not prescribed by law, and the ECtHR has long held that the “mere storing of 
information” on a person by the authorities amounts to an interference with the 
right to private life.118   
B. Government Access to User Data 
While access to platform data is advocated as an important tool to understand 
the distribution of disinformation, such access to user data could carry serious risks 
to user privacy. Specific attention is warranted for the inclusion of access-to-data 
provisions in new laws targeting disinformation. This issue raised its head during 
the passage of laws such as Germany’s Network Enforcement Act in 2017119 and 
France’s Law on combatting the manipulation of information. 
 
114. Catt v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43514/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe 
.int/eng?i=001-189424.  
115. Id. ¶ 97. 
116. Id. ¶ 123. 
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118. Id. ¶ 93. 
119. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in 
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 We turn first to Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was enacted, 
according to the German government, in order to not only tackle hate speech but 
the “spread of ‘fake news.’”120 The Act operates as follows: section 3(1) places an 
obligation on platforms to maintain an “effective and transparent procedure for 
handling complaints about unlawful content” and must “supply users with an easily 
recognisable, directly accessible and permanently available procedure for submitting 
complaints about unlawful content.”121 Unlawful content is defined as content 
criminalized under twenty-two criminal offences under the German Criminal Code. 
Section 3(2) then sets out how platforms must operate their procedures for handling 
reports of unlawful content. First, platforms must take “immediate note” of any 
complaint and check “whether the content reported in the complaint is unlawful 
and subject to removal or whether access to the content must be blocked.”122 
Second, and crucially, platforms must remove or block access to “content that is 
manifestly unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint.”123 The Act does 
not define “manifestly unlawful.”  
 While these provisions raise freedom of expression concerns, certain 
additional provisions raise right to privacy concerns.124 The UN Special Rapporteur 
on freedom of expression raised right to privacy concerns during the passage of the 
Act. First, there was concern over the provision that mandated “storage and 
documentation of data concerning violative content and user information related to 
such content, especially since the judiciary can order that data be revealed.”125 The 
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Special Rapporteur stated that this could “undermine the right individuals enjoy to 
anonymous expression,” and these  
restrictions on anonymity, in particular absent judicial oversight, facilitate 
State surveillance by simplifying the identification of individuals accessing 
or disseminating prohibited content. By requiring complaints and 
measures to be documented and stored for an undisclosed amount of time, 
without providing further protection mechanisms against the misuse of 
such data, individuals become more vulnerable to State surveillance. These 
provisions also allow for the collection and compilation of large amounts 
of data by the private sector, and place a significant burden and 
responsibility on corporate actors to protect the privacy and security of 
such data.126 
Second, the Special Rapporteur was concerned with the 
possibility that users claiming a violation would be entitled to be given 
access to subscriber data without prior court approval. The protection of 
anonymity, including protection against unlawful and arbitrary interference 
by state or non-state actors, plays a critical role in securing the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression. The absence of a judicial warrant for 
the disclosure of individual information would represent a restriction that 
is neither targeted nor protecting of due process rights, and it would 
therefore not meet the strict test required for restrictions on privacy and 
expression.127  
The German government responded that the Rapporteur’s “concerns of 
providing access to subscriber data without prior court approval have been met by 
introducing the requirement of a court decision prior to surrendering personal 
data.”128 Yet, in 2020, the German government made further amendments to the 
NetzDG Act by passing a law intended to combat right-wing extremism. This law 
requires that platforms send suspected criminal content directly to the federal police 
at the time it is reported by a user.129  
 Similarly, in France, there has been movement toward increased access to 
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Facebook had agreed to hand over identification data of French users suspected of 
posting hate speech on its platform to judges.130 Previously, Facebook had only 
cooperated on matters related to terrorism and violent acts by transferring the IP 
addresses and other identification data of suspected individuals to French judges. 
Notably, in relation to the 2018 Law on Combatting the Manipulation of 
Information, the UN Special Rapporteur raised concerns that the “cooperation 
mechanism established under Article 9 authorizes the Government to access the 
data of subscribers, related to the reported content, without prior court 
approval.”131 In particular, the “absence of a judicial authorization for the disclosure 
of personal information would be a restriction which is neither targeted nor 
protective of rights to a fair hearing and would therefore not meet the strict test for 
imposing restrictions on privacy and freedom of expression.”132  
Further, the French media regulator, Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA), 
adopted recommendations in 2019 under the 2018 Law on Combatting the 
Manipulation of Information, which “encourages” platforms to set up “appropriate 
procedures allowing for the detection of accounts disseminating false information 
on a massive scale.”133 The CSA also expressly states that it reserves the “ability [to] 
request[] any information should it observe a manipulation of information or an 
attempt to manipulate information likely to disturb public order or to affect the 
sincerity of an election.”134 
Outside of Europe, governments are going much further. Brazil’s draft Fake 
News Law mandates that platforms maintain records of forwarded messages for a 
period of four months, which may be requested under a court order.135  
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C. The Use of Data Protection Law as a Shield by Platforms  
While platforms are cooperating with governments in various initiatives to 
remove illegal and harmful content such as disinformation, platforms are 
simultaneously invoking data protection law concerns in response to recent efforts 
to increase transparency with respect to the function and impact of their systems. 
As mentioned above, access to platform data is widely considered a key mechanism 
in understanding the problems of disinformation, designing policy responses, and 
assessing platform responses. However, platforms have strong incentives, apart 
from data protection law, to keep their systems closed, including to maintain their 
dominant position in the market, where data are highly valuable.136 As Inge Graef, 
Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas, and Peggy Valcke argue, maintaining concentration and 
lack of access to data creates barriers for competitors and new entrants.137  
 There is tension in the EU Code of Practice on disinformation regarding 
access to data. The Code contains, as mentioned earlier, a pillar on platforms 
providing privacy-compliant access to data for research activities and for platforms 
to “cooperate by providing relevant data on the functioning of their services 
including data for independent investigation by academic researchers and general 
information on algorithms.”138 However, there has been a tension between the 
expectation under the Code for the facilitation of access to data and how it has 
played out in practice. Following its first year of operation, the European 
Commission commented that the provision of data to the research community was 
“episodic and arbitrary” and noted that platforms “generally cite alleged risks of 
data protection violations as inhibiting cooperation with the research 
community.”139 Similarly, in platform submissions on the operation of the Code, 
platforms such as Facebook admitted that “many stakeholders are eager for data to 
be made available as quickly as possible,” while adding that it was “committed to 
taking the time necessary to incorporate the highest privacy protections and 
building a data infrastructure that provides data in a secure manner.”140  
As such, there is growing frustration in European policy circles over the 
(strategic) attempts to leverage vague data protection law concerns. ERGA’s report 
on the operation of the Code’s data-access provision “show[s] clearly that the 
platforms provided very little (if any) access to data for independent 
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investigation.”141 Platforms argue “that they cannot provide free[] access to data 
because of privacy and data security reasons, but these reasons are not fully 
convincing.”142 This skepticism of the data-protection justifications put forward by 
platforms led ERGA to call upon platforms to “provide formal analyses identifying 
their specific concerns regarding data sharing for independent academic research 
under” the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).143 ERGA hoped that 
such analyses would provide a “starting point for resolving areas of ambiguity and 
uncertainty.”144 ERGA also called on data protection authorities to “offer formal 
guidance on permissible data sharing practices under GDPR.”145 Scholars are also 
skeptical of the data protection concerns put forward by platforms and in response 
are providing models for access to data based on the relevant experience of other 
sectors, such as health-data research.146  
The proposed Digital Services Act on reforming the EU’s rules in relation to 
platforms contains substantive new rules on access to data.147 An important part of 
the proposed legislation is the creation of new dedicated regulatory bodies, which 
would be empowered to access data from large online platforms and to gain insights 
into their business practices and the impact on users. Indeed, large platforms would 
also be obliged to provide data access to certain “vetted researchers” in order to 
conduct research that “contributes to the identification and understanding of 
systemic risks” associated with platforms,148 including intentional manipulation of 
platforms’ services and the inauthentic use or automated exploitation of their 
services.149  
III. DATA PROTECTION LAW AS A STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD   
In the previous two Parts, we reviewed the various ways in which 
disinformation policy can be a threat to the fundamental rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression. At the same time, privacy law and, in particular, data 
protection law currently provide the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe 
in relation to disinformation. However, before expanding upon the structural 
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safeguards provided by data protection law, many other structural safeguards for 
guaranteeing a pluralistic public debate and media environment existed in Europe, 
particularly around guaranteeing pluralism of viewpoints during election-time. Most 
EU member states still heavily regulate broadcast media by imposing many rules on 
broadcaster (both public and private) impartiality, fairness, and accuracy.150 During 
election-time, many EU member states prohibit paid-for political advertising on 
television. In countries such as Italy, a specific election law (“Par Condicio” Law) 
regulates election-time political communication across the press, broadcast, and 
online, with rules on media coverage of candidates, politicians, and political parties 
to ensure fairness and equal coverage.151 Further, EU member states regulate media 
reporting of opinion polls, exit polls, election debates, and impose silence periods 
in the run-up to polling day. Indeed, these rules came into play during the 2017 
French presidential election: just as the silence period was coming into effect, nine 
gigabytes of presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron’s confidential campaign 
documentation were published online. However, the French Presidential Election 
Commission (CNCCEP) issued a strongly worded statement on the eve of the 
election, urging both traditional media and online media to refrain from reporting 
on the content of the leaks. Indeed, French media generally heeded the call152 in the 
interests of ensuring free expression of the opinion of the people and the “sincerity 
of the vote.”153 
In addition to the aforementioned structural framework, data protection law 
also protects online users’ autonomy in relation to data-driven campaigns. Data 
protection law requires transparency for internet audiences about targeting and 
offers data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media 
companies that monetize social services in ways that create new avenues for 
audience targeting.  
It’s on this last aspect—the way that communications end up being 
disseminated on social media and other channels—that EU data protection law has 
the most potential. EU data protection law applies to the processing of personal 
data, which are defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual (natural person). This law requires transparency and a lawful basis such 
as consent. It also grants rights to access, correction, and deletion for data subjects, 
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all of which are subject to independent regulatory oversight. As personal data are 
likely to be a key ingredient to disinformation campaigns and strategies, data 
protection law will apply to the actors who are steering the messaging and 
campaigns, as well as the services, such as social media platforms, that provide a 
platform for data-driven communications. By putting a check on what is happening 
with personal data in the online domain, data protection law has the potential, at 
least in theory, to be an important safeguard. 
Areas in which data protection law and disinformation have intersected for 
quite some time are the use of personal data, predictive analytics, and behavioral 
targeting in elections. As the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) puts it in 
its recent guidance on elections, “Compliance with data protection rules, including 
in the context of electoral activities and political campaigns, is essential to protect 
democracy.”154 The EDPB notes that for targeted messaging “adequate 
information should be provided to voters explaining why they are receiving a 
particular message, who is responsible for it and how they can exercise their rights 
as data subjects.”155 It further notes the fact that voter data and personal data that 
reveal political opinions is considered a “special category” of data, which will 
generally require the explicit consent of the individual to be used by third parties.156 
It clarifies that personal data that has been made public, such as the information on 
someone’s social media profile, falls within the scope of the regulation and cannot 
be collected and processed without constraints. Finally, the guidance also highlights 
the special protections of people against profiling and automated decision-making. 
In this context, it notes that “profiling connected to targeted campaign messaging 
may in certain circumstances cause ‘similarly significant effects’ and shall in 
principle only be lawful with the valid explicit consent of the data subject.”157 
The most thorough guidance on the topic was released by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor in its Opinion on online manipulation and personal data.158 The 
Opinion covers a broad range of concerns around online manipulation (and the 
data-driven strategies underpinning new forms of manipulation). Notably, the 
context of disinformation and related strategies are of central concern to the EDPS. 
The EDPS considers online manipulation to be a symptom of a broader lack of 
accountability in the digital ecosystem. It calls for robust enforcement of existing 
data protection rules, together with other norms on elections and media pluralism 
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in view of the threats to fundamental rights and the functioning of democracy. The 
European Commission notes in its recent evaluation of the GDPR, “protecting 
personal data is . . . instrumental in preventing the manipulation of citizens’ choices, 
in particular via the micro-targeting of voters based on the unlawful processing of 
personal data, avoiding interference in democratic processes and preserving the 
open debate, the fairness and the transparency that are essential in a democracy.”159 
As pointed out by others, disinformation campaigns may involve the profiling 
of audiences with regard to their susceptibility to being misled by certain 
communications.160 In other words, whereas a certain susceptibility with respect to 
disinformation may exist, it’s the data-driven profiling and targeting that creates 
significant additional challenges. While some have proposed curtailment of the 
granularity of targeting possibilities in the context of political messaging, perhaps a 
similar result could be reached through strict enforcement of data protection rules 
with respect to political campaigns in Europe.  
CONCLUSION  
This Article has focused on the problematic aspects of European 
disinformation policy, particularly relating to overbroad content-based restrictions, 
law enforcement involvement, and increased monitoring of the online environment. 
However, another important strand of European disinformation policy is being 
developed under the European Democracy Action Plan adopted in late 2020.161 
Crucially, the Democracy Action Plan, as distinct from upcoming regulation of 
online platforms under the DSA, seeks to tackle disinformation through measures 
such as funding projects to support deliberative democratic infrastructures, 
strengthening media freedom and media pluralism, and strengthening 
empowerment of citizens to make informed decisions through strengthening media 
literacy.162 This framework is consistent with the ECtHR’s holding that states not 
only have a negative duty of non-interference with freedom of expression, but also 
have a “positive obligation” to put in place an appropriate legislative and 
administrative framework to guarantee effective pluralism163 and “create a 
favourable environment for participation in public debate by all the persons 
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concerned.”164 The Democracy Action Plan would align with international freedom 
of expression standards, which emphasize that a key means of addressing 
disinformation is for states to promote a free, independent, and diverse 
communications environment, including media diversity.165 
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